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In September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers sent financial markets in the United 
States into a spin. Credit markets froze as banks began to mistrust counterparties, not knowing 
the extent of toxic assets in loan portfolios that could lead to another major bank collapse. The 
crisis quickly spread around the world. Governments were urged to take drastic measures. 
Experts discussed the possible nationalization of portions of the U.S. banking industry and 
other sectors. Other countries also considered measures to save key industries.  
In the world of investor-state arbitration, many predicted that national measures to combat the 
economic crisis would result in treaty claims.1 Commentators also warned states to heed the 
lessons of Argentina, which was unable to escape its treaty obligations by invoking a state of 
necessity. Predicted investor claims included violations of non-discrimination, fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) and expropriation provisions. 
There is little evidence that the investment treaty regime anticipated the possibility of a 
worldwide economic crisis like that of 2008-2010. While claims against states responding to 
the crisis have yet to materialize, most investment treaties are silent with respect to a 
limitations period. Such claims may appear long after the crisis. States have, however, another 
defense: changed circumstances.2   
The defense typically has arisen in the context of treaty termination, but an unexplored aspect 
is a temporary suspension of treaty obligations. Different from necessity and force majeure, 
the defense of changed circumstances, classically known as rebus sic stantibus,3 is tailor-
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 International law has recognized this defense; see, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
Article 62. 
3
 The portion of the doctrine raised here focuses on the legitimate expectations of the parties, rather than excuses 
for non-performance. Provisions regarding necessity and force majeure are generally addressed in BITs, 
made for this crisis. Its literal meaning – “things standing thus” – refers to the expectations of 
the parties and the circumstances existing at the time a treaty was negotiated. In the context of 
investor claims arising from governmental responses to the crisis, the crisis itself is a 
fundamental change, not anticipated under the economic model on which the current treaty 
system is based, i.e., the “circumstances” existing in the 1990s. Some states can argue 
credibly that they did not cause the crisis, yet their economies were greatly affected. Under 
these changed circumstances, a state should be able to enact emergency economic measures to 
sustain critical national industries.  
If the investment treaty regime is to remain sustainable, should a state not be permitted to 
suspend its treaty obligations during exceptional circumstances? Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) permits temporary suspension but provides no 
guidance.  The circumstances that have changed must have constituted an “essential basis” of 
the parties’ consent, and the change must “radically transform” the extent of obligations. The 
VCLT permits the state to terminate the treaty entirely or temporarily suspend its obligations.  
A temporary suspension – a more limited response – logically should require a lower 
standard.  The VCLT uses the same standard for both actions.  This is perhaps the reason why 
Article 62 has been invoked rarely by states seeking to defend against claims relating to 
measures taken to address unanticipated crises. A mere suspension of treaty obligations would 
strengthen the treaty system by making it resilient. The standard for suspension, while 
remaining high, should take into account exceptional circumstances. A workable approach 
might include:  (i) an unforeseen global crisis; (ii) causing considerable hardship to significant 
populations; (iii) not a consequence of the state’s own actions; (iv) suspension is made in 
good faith with the expectation of resuming obligations; and (v) suspension is reasonable 
under the facts and circumstances. 
As the economic crisis has required many countries to undertake protective measures, the 
suspension of rights and obligations might be the most desirable option. The risk of not 
permitting suspension might cause states to consider less desirable alternatives when claims 
are asserted.4 Questions regarding the length of suspension, and which rights and obligations 
are suspended, are subjective. Arbitrators could make such determinations in light of facts and 
circumstances. Recognition that suspension of treaty obligations might be appropriate under 
certain circumstances will not weaken the treaty system but strengthen it. 
 
 
The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the following acknowledgment: “Hermann 
Ferré and Kabir Duggal, ‘The world economic crisis as a changed circumstance,’ Columbia FDI Perspectives, 
No. 43, August 1, 2011.  Reprinted with permission from the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International 
Investment (www.vcc.columbia.edu).” A copy should kindly be sent to the Vale Columbia Center at 
vcc@law.columbia.edu.  
  
For further information please contact: Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Ken 
Davies, Kenneth.Davies@law.columbia.edu.  
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), led by Dr. Karl P. Sauvant, is a joint 
center of Columbia Law School and The Earth Institute at Columbia University. It seeks to be a leader on issues 
related to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the global economy. VCC focuses on the analysis and teaching of 
the implications of FDI for public policy and international investment law.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
establishing the parties’ risk allocation. BITs rarely address global issues that might impact states at a macro 
level. 
4
 States already have shown scepticism toward this treaty regime. See Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Public Statement on International Investment Regime, (2010); George Kahale, III, “A problem in 
investor/State arbitration”, 6 (1) Transnational Dispute Management (2009). 
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